1941-a day when everyone knew what a Pullman train was, and when women were about to learn how to replicate stocking lines with eyebrow pencils. Alighting from the train was a diminutive man on his way to the War Department. He had no official status, no military rank, and although at forty-one he had reached a level of prominence in his field, no one would have noticed him much in a national capital that knew it was likely to go to war. The man stepped into a welter of activity, met a colleague for breakfast, and then headed for the Munitions Building.
and when women were about to learn how to replicate stocking lines with eyebrow pencils. Alighting from the train was a diminutive man on his way to the War Department. He had no official status, no military rank, and although at forty-one he had reached a level of prominence in his field, no one would have noticed him much in a national capital that knew it was likely to go to war. The man stepped into a welter of activity, met a colleague for breakfast, and then headed for the Munitions Building. It was already hot, but it would get hotter still before the day was out. It was late summer in DC. 1 Nineteen years later, The New York Times ran an extended obituary for the man, under the heading "Samuel Stouffer, Sociologist, Dead." Readers learned that Stouffer (1900 Stouffer ( -1960 was from Sac City, Iowa, and that he had held sociology professorships at Wisconsin, Chicago, and Harvard Universities. He had also been founding director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard, and had been president of both the American Sociological Association and the American Association for Public Opinion Research. Readers also learned what had come of Stouffer's train trip from Chicago to T Washington DC nineteen years before: "Dr. Stouffer was the principle [sic] author of 'The American Soldier,' an exhaustive study of the citizen-soldier…. The book was a report developed from the research work he directed during World War II at the Education and Information Division of the War Department." Lieutenant General James Gavin, commander of the famed 82 nd Airborne Division in World War II, was interviewed for the obituary, and he commented that Stouffer had made "a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars." The obituary also indicated that the knowledge gained in Stouffer's studies applied to business, urban planning, population control, public-opinion polls, civil liberties, and economics. It did indeed.
pressive work," 5 and many other influential figures also recognized its value and potential applications. Frank Stanton of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) wrote in 1944 that "the work Sam Stouffer has done for the Army is by all odds the best to come out of the war. For that matter, his program represents the most complete thing of its kind to date…. In this mass of data there are buried the answers to many methodological problems in the entire field of sampling and attitude measurement." 6 In the post-war years, The American Soldier became what scholars refer to as a "landmark work." Around the turn of the twentieth century, there was a fierce contest between those who struggled to explain war in traditional human terms and those who were beginning to explain war in scientific terms. Samuel A. Stouffer and his work were key to this debate, in showing how sociometrics could inform theories of human behaviour in war. The cockpit of the contest was the Second World War, yet the argument was not entirely settled in the 1940s, and it continues today-between those who believe that human behaviour is a matter of common sense, and those who believe that it can and should be quantified. Stouffer and the Research Branch of the War Department's Information and Education Division surveyed over half a million servicemen during World War II, work which represents the largest scientifically conducted survey of its kind. Unfortunately, what he learned is unknown but to specialists. As a result, social and particularly military history is often so fraught with myth, tradition, and nostalgia that it is becoming increasingly difficult to classify as history. Even the recent interest in the relationship of war to society has produced little inquiry into or analysis of Stouffer or his work, focussing instead on gender, labour, or political themes, or, less helpfully, rendering the soldier in heroic terms. Samuel Stouffer's life, and his work on The American Soldier, which quite literally required the analysis of at least five hundred thousand primary documents, reveal insights that might be helpful in distinguishing fact from fiction. A closer look at Stouffer and his career offers an opportunity to understand the relevance of The American Soldier and the climate of the time in which it was produced.
The purpose of this essay is to illuminate Samuel Stouffer's life and work, the impulses that gave rise to The American Soldier, how was it perceived, planned, and executed, and how it affected institutions and disciplines. "Samuel Stouffer and The American Soldier" undertakes simply to follow the advice of historian Sir Michael Howard on the three tasks of constructing narrative history: "First, find out what happened. Then, establish a chain of causation. Finally, apply critical judgment." 7 The essay is a synthesis of Stouffer's ideas as a sociologist as they met and in some respects formed military culture. From this meeting emerged modern military sociology and modern survey research. Stouffer repeatedly stressed in the introduction to The American Soldier that his was a social engineering rather than a social science task. "It must not be forgotten," he wrote, "that the Research Branch was set up to do a fast, practical job; it was an engineering operation; if some of its work has value for the future of social science this is a happy result, quite incidental to the mission of the branch in wartime." 9 To address the Army's concerns about desertions, Stouffer ran a quick study. He discovered that the Army was sending men home on leave in civilian clothes, and he recommended that they be required to travel in uniform instead. "There were few desertions at the point of embarkation after that," said Osborn, "It was a simple thing and such an amusing solution." 16 Stouffer's recommendation was simple to the point of elegance, and doubtless amusing to a man with Stouffer's sense of humour. Masters of their trades often make the complex look simple, the difficult look easy. If they are very good, they make it all a bit amusing as well. That Stouffer could solve a desertion problem with a change of clothing was not alchemy. He discovered that, as Osborn later remembered, "When soldiers went home or went to their families or friends in uniform they were made much of as soldiers. Their families were proud of them and their girlfriends said they were heroes, and saw them back to camp." 17 Just how it was that Stouffer understood such things is a compelling question, as ideas such as these do not simply spring from the ground. Stouffer's own experience, personality, and education certainly come to bear, but they are the end, not the beginning, of a long chain of intellectual history that begins as far back as the Stoics and their commitment to empirical observation. Sociological survey research existed long before it was formalized and named, and sociology and the military have been lurching towards their dialectical relationship since ancient times. More immediately, Stouffer himself reported that he and his staff were influenced greatly by the ideas about behaviour and attitudes extant at the time they wrote The American Soldier. Of these, three were paramount. Dynamic Psychology envisaged man not as a rational being, but rather as a creature moved by unconscious desires. Learning Theory was based upon a conditioned response through rewards and punishments. Social Anthropology and Sociology were predicated upon the "plasticity of the human organism," upon social roles, class, adaptation, and "the individual as a member of the social system." 18 The yawning gap between Homer and Stouffer, or rather the evolution of military sociology, is not, however, without some significant mile markers. Julius Caesar, Machiavelli, Napoleon, and dozens more have noted soldier attitudes and behaviour and commented on how they might be formed. 25 None before Stouffer, however, undertook a systematic, scientific, and vast survey research project to determine soldier attitudes. His predecessors generally felt that they had an innate ability to judge men, and that such things were matters of intuition and common sense. Stouffer may not have read Machiavelli's The Art of War, but it is almost certain that he read at least some of Caesar's Commentaries. His high school and college transcripts, as well as the institutional catalogues of his education, tell much about his intellectual development. Additionally, there are Stouffer's own writings and behaviour, all of which indicate a classically educated, insatiably curious modern stoic going about finding hard data rather than relying on impressions or conventional wisdom to make his case. Stouffer was born in Sac City, Iowa on 6 June 1900. He could not have known in his boyhood that he would research and help to form the attitudes of American soldiers landing at Normandy fortyfour years later. What he did know as he entered his teenage years was that war, and the behaviour of men in it, was a compelling subject. His father, Samuel Marcellus Stouffer, had become the owner of the Sac Sun newspaper in 1893, 26 the year of the great Chicago Exposition to which the state of Iowa had sent goods and services worth $125,000. 27 On the cover of the Iowa Exposition's report is a flagwaving, musket-bearing soldier, not unlike the bronze Union American Civil War soldier placed on a pedestal opposite the Sac County Courthouse the year before. 28 Young Samuel A. Stouffer often sat on the porch of his father's newspaper office, listening to Civil War veterans spin yarns of their experiences. 29 In 1923, Stouffer returned to Sac City with an MA in English from Harvard. He edited the newspaper until 1926, a time when the last of the Civil War veterans were dying, and their funeral announcements and obituaries were appearing in local papers. 30 In the summer of 1926, Stouffer sold the paper and entered doctoral studies in sociology at the University of Chicago, graduating in 1930. He remembered in an interview years later that he had decided to embark on such a study because, as a newspaperman, he had discovered that "people were tossing a lot of bunk around and it seemed a good idea to try to pin some of these things down." 31 Transcripts of his early formal education reveal an emphasis on the classics common at the time. At Sac City High School, he studied Latin through Caesar, Cicero, and Virgil, as well as English composition, French, German, history, and economics. These subjects were supplemented with a healthy dose of the hard sciences (physics, biology, and mathematics-both algebra and geometry). Graduating in 1918 and moving to nearby Morningside College in Sioux City, he took a BA in Latin in 1921, studying French, English, trigonometry, Bible literature, and military science along the way. 34 Although sociology was offered at Morningside as a major, Stouffer took no sociology courses. 35 Instead, he concentrated on rhetoric, taking courses in public speaking and participating successfully in intercollegiate debate. One of his yearbooks mentions that Stouffer could "find more to say and say it in less time than any member of the class. He is always ready to take the lead and is always hunting new work. He disguises himself and many are the things he finds out. Among his accomplishments are those of a book agent, newspaper man, debater and comedian." His dizzying array of extracurricular activities-tennis, editorship of the college paper, and membership in the YMCA, Student Council, Republican Club, and Literary Society-provide insight into his restless energy and devotion to his work. 36 While in college, he also met Ruth McBurney, whom he married in 1924, and with whom he had three children. By 1949, when Stouffer published The American Soldier, he was a master of the major ideas in sociology, psychology, anthropology. The colleague he breakfasted with upon his arrival in Washington in August 1941 was political scientist Harold Lasswell, who had written his doctoral dissertation on World War I propaganda, and who was a pioneer in the field of applied psychology. 37 After lunch the same day, Stouffer met with Walter Bingham, holder of doctorates from both Harvard and the University of Chicago. Bingham was founder and director of the prestigious Carnegie Institute of Technology's Division of Applied Psychology, and during World War I he had designed the classification, personality, and intelligence tests for the Army that were the starting point for similar tests in World War II, and which became the basis for the modern Scholastic Aptitude Tests given to American high school students. During World War II, Bingham was the Army's head psychologist. 38 The next day at lunch
Stouffer met Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office of Scientific and Research Development, which oversaw the beginnings of the Manhattan Project (the atomic bomb) and the development of, among other things, radar, the proximity fuse, and the Norden bombsight. 39 Stouffer spent the war years working with these men and many like them. In acknowledging the contributions of his colleagues to The American Soldier, Stouffer named some of the most influential scholars, government officials, and businessmen in the United States at the time, from some of the most prestigious institutions. 40 Like Stouffer, these contributors had the ability to transcend their own disciplines and work with others on the problem at hand, win-ning the war. They did not live in a world of Cartesian separations which would have prevented them from apprehending the dynamics of a world war, or would have prevented their cooperation. The stiff divisions that exist today between academic disciplines were not yet in place.
The The Research Branch had a definitive compass, found in its name. Stouffer, an empiricist, believed in the value of research and evidence. He commented early in The American Soldier on "the experimental tradition," and went on to write that "Just as medicine did not make distinctive progress until the exclusively clinical approach gave way to controlled experiments as a method of rigorous verification of hypotheses, so social psychology is likely to be limited in its development until the habit of required experimental verification is firmly established in research in social psychology." 43 His tool was the survey. A look at Stouffer's doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago (1930) is instructive in this connection. In "An Experimental Comparison of Statistical and Case History Methods of Attitude Research," 44 Stouffer studied the attitudes of 238 University of Chicago students towards prohibition. He demonstrated that statistical survey methods rendered almost the same results as case histories evaluated by experts, and he stressed that his conclusion "rests on experimental evidence," which he presented in detail. 45 The intrinsic value of survey research notwithstanding, the war became an important focus for the Research Branch. As Ellen Herman noted, "Dedicated throughout the war to enlarging their own sphere of influence, experts nonetheless quickly grasped that furthering a psychological science of social relations or theory of society was not the point. Stouffer's pre-war experiences gave him the ability to work as an outsider within a large bureaucracy, none of which was more intimidating and tribal than the United States Army. He was keenly aware that he had no official status as far as the Army was concerned. He wore no uniform, and, although he was ultimately granted the rank and privileges of a brigadier general, he was wise enough never to don one, as many of his colleagues did. He knew that he had not been through the rites of passage required to wear a uniform, and he understood the totemic significance of the uniform within his society. Nor did he arrive in Washington full of demands for information, office space, a secretary, or letterhead. He took the opposite approach, as he had done years earlier when he was an undergraduate newspaper editor: he disguised himself, and thus he was able to find out many things. He knew that he would, in his words, "not get to first base for SSRC without some kind of War Dept. status." One of his friends in Washington told him that the War Department was the "hardest nut in Washington to crack," and Stouffer understood the truth of it. 54 On Stouffer's second day in Washington, Osborn arranged for him to be an expert consultant to the Secretary of War. "Expert," commented Stouffer wryly in his notes, "quite a joke; know less about the army than about the Vatican." But he did know how to learn. "My idea is to hunt the fellow actually carrying the ball; he may be far down in a hierarchy…. I want to learn from ground up; not just what is officially said but what is really done." His understanding that there is a difference between the two would serve him well. He spent his early days in Washington making contacts and asking polite questions, looking at records and talking with colleagues about how selection and classification of soldiers had been done in World War I. He remained all too aware of how easily he could be marginalized. "I don't blame old army officers for looking at a layman like me as a nuisance…. I know darned well how I'd feel if the V.P. of the university sent a layman around to cooperate with me on my teaching & research & I suspect the army is much more of a club than a university."
55 His sensitivity to the Army's institutional mores helped to produce in him understanding, and even wisdom. Stouffer's impact on the ultimate Allied victory in World War II should not be underestimated. Based on what he had learned at Chicago, and numerous refinements in the years between 1930 and 1940, Stouffer and his team of sociologists and psychologists at Research Branch designed a twelve-step system for gathering and processing data on soldier attitudes. As described in a Research Branch briefing, the system proceeded as follows:
1. Research Branch consults with members of staff section requesting survey. 2. Trained field man informally interviews GIs on problems bearing on study. 3. After carefully testing all questions, final questionnaire form is prepared. 4. Units to be sampled are selected in order to insure representativeness. 5. A short talk explains survey purpose: given to men by trained class leader. 6. Each man in the assembled group fills out questionnaire form anonymously. 7. Questionnaires are processed by having each answer assigned a numerical code. 8. Codes representing soldiers' answers are punched as holes on IBM (MRU) cards. 9. The information is placed on these IBM cards with electrical punch machines. 10. Holes enable cards to be electronically sorted and tabulated: 7 per second. 11. Expert technician of Research Branch analyzes data and summarizes findings. 12. A report of findings is prepared and then submitted to agencies concerned. 56 Using this system, Stouffer was able to apply the techniques he had employed to survey 238 University of Chicago Students to approximately 500,000 soldiers during World War II. Questions about prohibition became questions about the Army, such as "Do you agree or disagree with the statement that the Russians can be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war?" (Agree 44%, Undecided 40%, Disagree 16%). 57 Black soldiers were asked, "Suppose your company could get its lieutenants from the North only, but they could be either WHITE or NEGRO. Which would you rather have?" (57% Negro, 33% No Difference, 10% White). 58 Such data was quickly translated into policy changes or propaganda through training films or Army publications. By war's end, fifty-five military personnel and sixty-eight civilians had worked or were working in the Washington, D.C. headquarters of Research Branch, many of them prominent sociologists and psychologists. The branch produced well over three hundred and fifty surveys, studies, and information papers, along with the voluminous correspondence attendant with any bureaucracy. Their surveys were eclectic, with titles from "Memorandum on the Attitudes of New Recruits" (March 1942) to "Attitudes of Dischargees toward Separation and Evaluation of Information Provided at the Separation Center" (October 1945). 59 Survey reports were generally based on attitudes of soldiers in a specific theatre, or attitudes towards a specific issue. Sometimes the research questions were narrow, and bordered on the ridiculous, such as the "laundry situation in Panama." Often, however, they were broad, such as the "very serious morale problems of the Infantry," which resulted in "revision of pay scales, the introduction of symbols such as the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the Expert Infantryman's Badge, and the development of an aggressive program of publicity." 60 While field commanders may have been understandably vexed at being told they had to worry about laundry services in the middle of a world war, they tended to be more receptive to the larger issues of managing a draftee Army, and keeping that Army pointed towards the enemy rather than grousing amongst themselves.
In the wake of the tepid American performance in Operation Torch-their debut in the European theatre in North Africa-and the debacle at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943, where several American units broke and ran, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall had good reason to question the "common sense" approach to knowing soldier attitudes. Marshall had approved the Army's Operations Field Manual (FM 100-5) on 22 May 1941. The manual stated that "man is the fundamental instrument in war," that "the essential considerations" in training "are to integrate individuals into a group and to establish for that group a high standard of military conduct," and that "war places a severe test on the physical endurance and moral stamina of the individual soldier." Despite the use of words such as "fundamental" and "essential," any systematic effort to establish primary groups had been sacrificed to speed and numbers as the Army hastily prepared for Torch. Instead, officers tended to rely on their own experience as wisdom, and on the belief that "strong men, inculcated with a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in their unit, and a feeling of mutual obligation to their comrades in the group, can dominate the demoralizing influences of battle." Indeed, FM 100-5 assured the officer that "By personal observation and experience, he will then be able to judge … [troop] needs and combat value." 61 Notwithstanding this sort of lip-service, the Americans found in North Africa that the Germans could be ruthless teachers, unsympathetic to the willpower and confidence of their GI enemies. John W. Appel, Chief of the Army's Mental Hygiene Branch and a consultant for Research Branch, described the effects of combat on soldiers in a 1944 report of an investigative trip to North Africa. Appel began his report by reminding his readers that "psychiatric disorders have constituted the leading cause for medical evacuations." His detailed observations, because they have been so often ignored or forgotten, deserve quotation at length:
The key to understanding the psychiatric problem is the simple fact that danger of being killed imposes a strain so great that it causes men to break down. This fact is frequently not appreciated and cannot be fully understood until one has either seen psychiatric cases just out of the lines or himself has actually been exposed to bombing, shell, and mortar fire. One look at the shrunken apathetic faces of psychiatric patients as they come stumbling into the medical station, sobbing, trembling, referring shudderingly to 'them shells' and to buddies mutilated or dead, is enough to convince most observers. Anyone entering the combat zone undergoes a profound emotional change which can no more be described than can sexual intercourse. Each man 'up there' knows that at any moment he may be killed, a fact kept constantly before his mind by the sight of dead and mutilated buddies around him. To one who has been 'up there' it is obvious that there is no such thing as 'getting used to combat.' Each moment of it imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure. Thus psychiatric casualties are as inevitable as gun shot or shrapnel wounds in warfare. 62 In response, Marshall ordered Research Branch to conduct a survey and produce a report. This was undertaken with the cooperation of the Neuropsychiatry Branch of the Surgeon General's Office. The report of 1 October 1943,"Report B-66: Fear of German Weapons," was based on responses to questions by over seven hundred enlisted men who had recently been evacuated from North Africa, and indicated the complex nature of attitudes and the need for more than instinct as a guide to designing soldier training:
1. The German 88 mm. gun is considered by the men to be both the most frightening and most dangerous German weapon. 2. Men rate the dive bomber as the second most frightening weapon, despite the fact that they consider it relatively ineffective in inflicting casualties. 3. The light machine gun and rifle are seldom rated as most frightening or most dangerous weapons, although their effectiveness is shown by the fact that they account for a high proportion of the wounds among the men interviewed. 4. Only about half of the men say that combat experience reduced their fear of the weapon that was most frightening to them. 5. The proportion of men considering bombing most frightening decreases with increased combat experience, while the proportion fearing artillery increases.
Soldiers revealed, among other things, the counter-intuitive idea that factors other than what is most likely to hurt them accounted for their fear. The psychologists and sociologists of Research Branch acknowledged in the report that "To bring about some balance between the known effectiveness of weapons and the degree to which men fear them is a major problem of soldier training." Recommendations for solving this problem included more training under live ammunition, training with captured enemy weapons, more training on protection from German weapons, discussions on fear, and more realistic combat simulations. 63 Within six weeks of the release of Report B-66, the National Defense Research Council requested a copy of the report on behalf of the Navy, which was considering "the usefulness of battle noise equipment in the selection and training of Naval personnel." 64 So it went with the majority of Research Branch's work-everyone wanted a copy. And, as intuition and instinct gave way to research and analysis, morale and performance improved.
In In addition to issue-specific reports, Research Branch also published during the war sixteen summaries of their findings. Much as The American Soldier is a post-war summary of the many diverse surveys and studies conducted by Research Branch, "What the Soldier Thinks" reports were monthly summaries during the war of Research Branch's work. These reports provided commanders and higher level staffs with information on soldier attitudes-what today would be called "actionable intelligence." The first issue was published in December 1943, and included a primer on morale, an article about the relationship between fighting spirit and physical conditioning, and a comforting re-affirmation of the old saw that busy soldiers are happy soldiers. Commanders read that the purpose of the report was "that of bringing to officers concerned information of practical value in maintaining the morale and the fighting efficiency of troops under their command." For doubters, and those comfortable with their own ability to monitor their soldiers' morale through intuition, the report offered the explanation that "studies of soldier attitudes reported here are based on the statistical analysis of replies made anonymously to questions asked of thousands of soldiers in overseas theaters in [sic] Continental United States. Such factual evidence is more representative-and therefore more generally applicable-than the personal impressions of even the most experienced and able officer-observers." 67 The final issue of "What the Soldier Thinks," dated September 1945, considered such issues as "The Point Discharge Plan in Operation," and "Things Combat Soldiers Would Change in the Army." Twenty-one percent of soldiers surveyed thought the point discharge plan was very good, while forty-nine percent called it "fairly good." Only eight percent thought it "not good at all." As for things combat soldiers would change in the Army, the leading desire was for "some form of relief from the hard grind of combat." The other major desired change was for "better relations between officers and enlisted men." This final issue of "What the Soldier Thinks" printed that the men wanted "officers to be one of the men and not a dictator who treats a man that is fighting like a dog." Changes in policy during the war clearly indicate that at least some officers were reading and reacting to what was reported in "What the Soldier Thinks." Although few of these officers would have been likely to pick up the heavy tomes of The American Soldier, even if these had been available during the war, they did, despite their suspicions, read "What the Soldier Thinks." 68 After the war, academia, business, and government took full advantage of the Research Branch's labours. The GI Bill, which granted veterans affordable housing and educational benefits, was based upon Research Branch findings. Scholars, executives, and government officials began to speak of human and social engineering, at first as a means to avoid future wars, and later as a means for better education, business, race relations, and government. Those who had worked with the Research Branch in World War II took up prominent positions in universities, business, and government, from which they kept in touch with each other and exerted a major influence of postwar psychology and sociology. 69 Seemingly everyone wanted Stouffer's opinion on how to analyze attitudes and opinions, from pollster Elmo Roper to Standard Oil. 70 Often, retailers would conduct their own studies, and then refer them to Stouffer for comment. One of the more interesting of these was a detailed study by Schlitz in 1958 on the demographics, psychology, and preferences of American beer drinkers. But as the US military left World War II behind and headed toward conflicts such as Vietnam, Stouffer's work seemed to resonate less and less with them, although he was often asked for his opinion. Among his many projects for the military were consultations in 1954 on the Vietnam Area Study, and extensive work on Project Revere, an analysis of the effectiveness of propaganda leaflets. 71 Beyond his activities for the military, Stouffer in 1955 published what many believe to be his most influential work, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. Again using survey research, Stouffer demonstrated that the average American was much less concerned with communism than the demagogue Senator Eugene McCarthy wanted people to believe. For his pains, Stouffer received special attention from J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and had to show cause to retain his security clearance. Shortly before his death in 1960, Stouffer was in Puerto Rico conducting research on population control, and only the swift progress of the cancer that killed him forced him to leave his work behind. 72 Stouffer conducted his post-war work from Harvard's Laboratory of Social Relations, of which he had been appointed founding director in 1946. In addition to his many other duties and consulting projects, he chaired the Joint Committee of the National Research Council and Social Science Research Council, which continued to refine the survey research techniques he had employed to produce The American Soldier. 73 In 1953, he served as the President of the American Sociological Association (ASA), and delivered the customary annual address. Unsurprisingly, he chose for his subject "Measurement in Sociology." He asked his audience to consider "the place of measurement in the process of invention in sociology itself, as a special case of the general working of invention in technology and science." He further asked, "If students of culture do not examine their own discipline as a specimen of culture, who else will do it better?" Clearly, he believed that sociology was a science. He spoke of "quantitative methods" and sociology's ability to "measure interactions." Nevertheless, he concluded his address by acknowledging the value of philosophy and art to sociology, and stated that the best sociological work is done by that sociologist or team of specialists who can combine philosophical, artistic, and scientific methods. His prediction for the future of sociology was a bright one, ending with the phrase, "I bid you welcome into a brave new world." 74 That summer at Berkeley in 1953, however, Stouffer was not content with simply giving an address, and what he did there demonstrates one of the dozens of reasons he has remained such an influential figure in sociology. Prior to the conference, he had asked each of the living former presidents of the ASA to record a two-minute message to "a young PhD just launching his or her sociological career." The audience then heard from many of the scholars who had founded and formed American sociology. Among them were Emory S. Bogardus, Leonard S. Cottrell Among the contributions of The American Soldier that have had a continuing influence on sociology is the concept of relative deprivation. Stouffer calls this idea "simple, almost obvious." According to Stouffer's definition, the comprehension of sacrifice felt by soldiers in taking on the role was "greater for some than for others, depending on their standards of comparison." He noted that the idea was related to "well known sociological concepts," such as "'social frame of reference,' 'patterns of expectation,' or 'definitions of situation.'" 76 Relative deprivation was an idea with far-reaching im- In the late 1930s he formulated the idea of "intervening opportunities" in migration, which considered the effect of en route as well as destination opportunities and their effect on American migration patterns. 78 But the most important legacy of Samuel A. Stouffer is his contribution to survey research. The practice of digging through census records for demographic information and social conclusions was to transform into a systematic method of asking specific questions to answer specific problems-survey research-largely due to the efforts of Samuel A. Stouffer. 79 Stouffer, like many in the "soft sciences" of his day, was doing what he could to "harden" his discipline into a "proper" science. Happily, his grounding in the liberal arts, particularly his graduate work in English and his experience as a newspaper editor never left him. His lectures were peppered with both Shakespearean quotations and baseball statistics, making his work both enjoyable and accessible. He also maintained a keen sense of history and geography. Much of his summer vacation time was devoted to travelling with his family. He wanted his children to see every state capital, and when he visited the Tower of London he told them, with some relish, of the beheadings and imprisonments that had taken place there. He also ensured that his children had a good sense of sociological problems in the United States, sometimes taking them to the South to visit the segregation of the Jim Crow region first hand, and other times allowing them to accompany him as he did his field work.
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Part of the value, then, of The American Soldier is the voice in which it was written, its clear, simple prose, free of bureaucratic or scientific jargon. Stouffer also, refreshingly, was quick in The American Soldier to explain his survey and research methods and to point out their limitations. All of his written work reads as if it was written, not by a man striving to be a scientist, but rather by a man wanting to convey complex ideas elegantly. Stouffer's voice is an eminently human voice, and a reflection of his personal life as well as his professional education.
"What an empiricist he was!" sociologist Herbert H. Hyman wrote of Stouffer in a 1962 Public Opinion Quarterly article. Hyman wrote that, unfortunately, even Stouffer's writings are "too pallid a representation" of Stouffer's style. "How passionately Sam could attack a table, or an IBM machine, and not only in the darkest hours of night, but all through the next day as well." 81 Howard Schuman, a sociology professor at the University of Michigan and a student of Stouffer at Harvard, dedicated two of his books to the chief author of The American Soldier: "Stouffer had a firm belief in the value of survey research, but at the same time a commitment to understanding its limitations and developing its potential so that it could be used more wisely for both practical and theoretical ends."
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A chain smoker who ended most of his working days covered in chalk dust and ashes, Stouffer had his faults and foibles, but he is generally remembered as affable, warm, and possessed of a restless energy that never seemed to fail him. He held himself and those around him to high standards, was deeply interested in the education of his children, and was, in that hackneyed phrase, the consummate professional. James Davis, of the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center and a former student of Stouffer's, remembered him as looking "a bit like the men who played fussy bookkeepers in 1930's screwball comedies," and lacking "the combination of paternalism and narcissism that motivates the Great Man. Sam simply wanted to get on with the job….but Sam was a great sociologist." 83 This, then, was the diminutive man who stepped off the train and into World War II Washington that hot, muggy summer day in 1941.
Modern social historians are deeply interested in identity and how it develops. But "identity," notes historian Wayne E. Lee, "as many historians have discovered, is a funny thing. It is simultaneously defined by the self and the observer-usually not in the same way." 84 Hollywood and scores of books have co-opted the identity of the soldier and, in the United States particularly, the identity of the World War II American soldier. Modern Homers film or write, basing their findings largely on letters and diaries, recruiting posters, oral histories, and heroic and moving Norman Rockwell paintings which depict the ideal, rather than the reality, of warfare in American life. Their efforts do indeed add to the body of knowledge, but they tend to minister to modern demands for two-dimensional caricatures of soldiers as either heroes or villains. Neither of these is found in the pages of The American Soldier, but rather human beings caught up in events well beyond their control, reacting and developing attitudes that are full of ambiguity and nuance. Stouffer was a kind of circular conduit for soldiers, gathering their attitudes and using the data to influence policies about soldiers. Their attitudes were their identities, and he returned their identities to them with policy. Stouffer was asking, in as scientific a way as he knew, how soldiers interpret their own experience. He was, in a very real and verifiable way, the best and most informed advocate of their identities as they saw them. Here, then, is the value of Stouffer's work, and a better understanding of the American World War II GI should, it seems, begin here. Soldier attitudes and Stouffer's work with them helped to shape modern sociology, a contribution most of them would have been oblivious to, but that was no less real for it. Were this not the case, a reference to Stouffer and The American Soldier would not appear on the second page of a Strategic Studies Institute Report of July 2003 on combat motivation in Iraq. 85 Samuel A. (1960) , he asked Stouffer to assist him with a bulletin he was writing for a Russell Sage Foundation series on sociology in military organizations. "The idea behind it," Janowitz wrote to Stouffer, "apparently is for me to write a brief overview of what has been done and how sociology might relate itself to the problems of changing military organization." Stouffer consented to serve on Janowitz's advisory committee, and Ja-
